48 research outputs found
Misuse Resistant Parallel Authenticated Encryptions
The authenticated encryptions which resist misuse of initial value (or nonce) at some desired level of privacy are two-pass or Mac-then-Encrypt constructions (inherently inefficient but provide full privacy) and online constructions, e.g., McOE, sponge-type authenticated encryptions (such as duplex, AEGIS) and COPA. Only the last one is almost parallelizable with some bottleneck in processing associated data. In this paper, {\em we design a new online secure authenticated encryption, called \tx{ELmE} or Encrypt-Linear mix-Encrypt, which is completely (two-stage) {\bf parallel} (even in associated data) and {\bf pipeline implementable}}. It also provides full privacy when associated data (which includes initial value) is not repeated. The basic idea of our construction and COPA are based on \tx{EME}, an Encrypt-Mix-Encrypt type SPRP constructions (secure against chosen plaintext and ciphertext). Unlike \tx{EME}, we consider (so does COPA) online computable {\bf linear mixing}. In addition with getting rid of bottleneck, our construction optionally supports {\bf intermediate tags} which can be verified faster with less buffer size. Intermediate tag provides security against block-wise adversaries which is meaningful in low-end device implementation
Modeling Power Efficiency of S-boxes Using Machine Learning
In the era of lightweight cryptography, designing cryptographically good and power efficient 4x4 S-boxes is a challenging problem. While the optimal cryptographic properties are easy to determine, verifying the power efficiency of an S-box is non-trivial. The conventional approach of determining the power consumption using commercially available CAD-tools is highly time consuming, which becomes formidable while dealing with a large pool of S-boxes. This mandates development of an automation that should quickly characterize the power efficiency from the Boolean function representation of an S-box. In this paper, we present a supervised machine learning assisted automated framework to resolve the problem for 4x4 S-boxes, which turns out to be 14 times faster than traditional approach. The key idea is to extrapolate the knowledge of literal counts, AND-OR-NOT gate counts in SOP form of the underlying Boolean functions to predict the dynamic power efficiency. The experimental results and performance of our novel technique depicts its superiority with high efficiency and low time overhead. We demonstrate effectiveness of our framework by reporting a set of power efficient optimal S-boxes from a large set of S-boxes. We also develop a deterministic model using results obtained from supervised learning to predict the dynamic power of an S-box that can be used in an evolutionary algorithm to generate cryptographically strong and low power S-boxes
Tight Security Bound of 2k-LightMAC Plus
In ASIACRYPT\u2717, Naito proposed a beyond-birthday-bound variant of the LightMAC construction, called LightMAC_Plus, which is built on three independently keyed -bit block ciphers, and showed that the construction achieves -bits PRF security. Later, Kim et al. claimed (without giving any formal proof) its security bound to . In FSE\u2718, Datta et al. have proposed a two-keyed variant of the LightMAC_Plus construction, called 2k-LightMAC_Plus, which is built on two independently keyed -bit block ciphers, and showed that the construction achieves -bits PRF security. In this paper, we show a tight security bound on the 2k-LightMAC_Plus construction. In particular, we show that it provably achieves security up to queries. We also exhibit a matching attack on the construction with the same query complexity and hence establishing the tightness of the security bound. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that provably shows a message length independent -bit tight security bound on a block cipher based variable input length PRF with two block cipher keys
INT-RUP Security of SAEB and TinyJAMBU
The INT-RUP security of an authenticated encryption (AE)
scheme is a well studied problem which deals with the integrity security
of an AE scheme in the setting of releasing unverified plaintext model.
Popular INT-RUP secure constructions either require a large state (e.g.
GCM-RUP, LOCUS, Oribatida) or employ a two-pass mode (e.g. MON-
DAE) that does not allow on-the-fly data processing. This motivates us
to turn our attention to feedback type AE constructions that allow small
state implementation as well as on-the-fly computation capability. In CT-
RSA 2016, Chakraborti et al. have demonstrated a generic INT-RUP
attack on rate-1 block cipher based feedback type AE schemes. Their
results inspire us to study about feedback type AE constructions at a
reduced rate. In this paper, we consider two such recent designs, SAEB
and TinyJAMBU and we analyze their integrity security in the setting of
releasing unverified plaintext model. We found an INT-RUP attack on
SAEB with roughly 232 decryption queries. However, the concrete analysis shows that if we reduce its rate to 32 bits, SAEB achieves the desired
INT-RUP security bound without any additional overhead. Moreover, we
have also analyzed TinyJAMBU, one of the finalists of the NIST LwC,
and found it to be INT-RUP secure. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work reporting the INT-RUP security analysis of the block cipher based single state, single pass, on-the-fly, inverse-free authenticated
ciphers
Designing Full-Rate Sponge based AEAD modes
Sponge based constructions have gained significant popularity for designing lightweight authenticated encryption modes. Most of the authenticated ciphers following the Sponge paradigm can be viewed as variations of the Transform-then-permute construction. It is known that a construction following the Transform-then-permute paradigm provides security against any adversary having data complexity and time complexity as long as . Here, represents the size of the underlying permutation, while pertains to the rate at which the message is injected. The above result demonstrates that an increase in the rate leads to a degradation in the security of the constructions, with no security guaranteed to constructions operating at the full rate, where . This present study delves into the exploration of whether adding some auxiliary states could potentially improve the security of the Transform-then-permute construction.
Our investigation yields an affirmative response, demonstrating that a special class of full rate Transform-then-permute with additional states, dubbed frTtP+, can indeed attain security when operated under a suitable feedback function and properly initialized additional state. To be precise, we prove that frTtP+ provides security as long as and , where denotes the size of the auxiliary state in terms of bits. To demonstrate the applicability of this result, we show that the construction belongs to this class, thereby obtaining the desired security. In addition, we propose a family of full-rate Transform-then-permute construction with a Beetle-like feedback function, dubbed \textsf{fr-Beetle}, which also achieves the same level of security
Double-block Hash-then-Sum: A Paradigm for Constructing BBB Secure PRF
SUM-ECBC (Yasuda, CT-RSA 2010) is the first beyond birthday bound (BBB) secure block cipher based deterministic MAC. After this work, some more BBB secure deterministic MACs have been proposed, namely PMAC_Plus (Yasuda, CRYPTO 2011), 3kf9 (Zhang et al., ASIACRYPT 2012) and LightMAC_Plus (Naito, ASIACRYPT 2017). In this paper, we have abstracted out the inherent design principle of all these BBB secure MACs and present a generic design paradigm to construct a BBB secure pseudo random function, namely Double-block Hash-then- Sum or in short (DbHtS). A DbHtS construction, as the name implies, computes a double block hash on the message and then sum the encrypted output of the two hash blocks. Our result renders that if the underlying hash function meets certain security requirements (namely cover-free and block-wise universal advantage is low), DbHtS construction provides 2n/3-bit security. We demonstrate the applicability of our result by instantiating all the existing beyond birthday secure deterministic MACs (e.g., SUM-ECBC, PMAC_Plus, 3kf9, LightMAC_Plus) as well as a simple two-keyed variant for each of them and some algebraic hash based constructions
Cascading Four Round LRW1 is Beyond Birthday Bound Secure
In CRYPTO\u2702, Liskov et al. have introduced a new symmetric key primitive called tweakable block cipher. They have proposed two constructions of designing a tweakable block cipher from block ciphers. The first proposed construction is called and the second proposed construction is called . Although, has been extended in later works to provide beyond birthday bound security (e.g., cascaded in CRYPTO\u2712 by Landecker et al.), but extension of the has received no attention until the work of Bao et al. in EUROCRYPT\u2720, where the authors have shown that one round extension of , i.e., masking the output of with the given tweak and then re-encrypting it with the same block cipher, gives security up to queries. Recently, Khairallah has shown a birthday bound distinguishing attack on the construction and hence invalidated the security claim of Bao et al. This has led to the open research question, that {\em how many round are required for cascading to achieve beyond birthday bound security ?}
In this paper, we have shown that cascading up to four rounds is sufficient for ensuring beyond the birthday bound security. In particular, we have shown that provides security up to queries. Security analysis of our construction is based on the recent development of the mirror theory technique for tweakable random permutations under the framework of the Expectation Method
On the Security of Triplex- and Multiplex-type Constructions with Smaller Tweaks
In TCHES’22, Shen et al. proposed Triplex, a single-pass
leakage-resistant authenticated encryption scheme based on Tweakable Block Ciphers (TBCs) with 2n-bit tweaks. Triplex enjoys beyond-birthday-bound ciphertext integrity in the CIML2 setting and birthday-bound confidentiality in the CCAmL1 notion. Despite its strengths, Triplex’s operational efficiency was hindered by its sequential nature, coupled with a rate limit of 2/3. In an endeavor to surmount these efficiency challenges, Peters et al. proposed Multiplex, a variant of Triplex with increased parallelism and a flexible rate of d/(d+1) that retains similar security guarantees. However, the innovation came at the price of requiring TBCs with dn-bit tweaks, which are unusual and potentially costly for d > 3. In this paper, we investigate the limits of generalized Triplex- and Multiplex-type constructions for single-pass leakage-resilient authenticated encryption. Our contributions are threefold. First, we show that such constructions cannot provide CIML2 integrity for any tweak lengths below dn/2 bits.
Second, we provide a birthday-bound attack for constructions with TBCs of tweak lengths between dn/2 and (d − 1)n + n/2 bits. Finally, on the constructive side, we propose a family of single-pass leakage-resilient authenticated ciphers, dubbed Tweplex, that uses tweaks of dn/2 bits and provides a rate of d/(d + 1) while providing n/2-bit CIML2 integrity and CCAmL1 confidentiality
Cascading Four Round LRW1 is Beyond Birthday Bound Secure
In CRYPTO’02, Liskov et al. introduced the concept of a tweakable block cipher, a novel symmetric key primitive with promising applications. They put forth two constructions for designing such tweakable block ciphers from conventional block ciphers: LRW1 and LRW2. While subsequent efforts extended LRW2 to achieve security beyond the birthday bound (e.g., cascaded LRW2 in CRYPTO’12 by Landecker et al.), the extension of LRW1 remained unexplored until Bao et al.’s work in EUROCRYPT’20 that considered cascaded LRW1, a one-round extension of LRW1 - entailing masking the LRW1 output with the given tweak and re-encrypting it with the same block cipher. They showed that CLRW1 offers security up to 22n/3 queries. However, this result was challenged by Khairallah’s recent birthday bound distinguishing attack on cascaded LRW1, effectively refuting the security claim of Bao et al. Consequently, a pertinent research question emerges: How many rounds of cascaded LRW1 are required to obtain security beyond the birthday bound? This paper addresses this question by establishing that cascading LRW1 for four rounds suffices to ensure security beyond the birthday bound. Specifically, we demonstrate that 4 rounds of CLRW1 guarantees security for up to 23n/4 queries. Our security analysis is based from recent advancements in the mirror theory technique for tweakable random permutations, operating within the framework of the Expectation Method